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L. F. E. GOLDIE*

Equity and the International
Management of Transboundary
Resources
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly sophisticated human uses of natural resources and additional discoveries of mineral deposits with biological and energy potential
mandate the creation of new management regimes for transboundary
resources. The problem of establishing managerial and distributional regimes agreeable to the states which are adjacent to such deposits and
which lay individual claims to share in the common resources presents
important questions. In this article the question of how equitable principles
arising under international law can provide both guidelines and benchmarks for the draftsmen of treaties establishing regimes of sharing and
for policy makers involved in the apportionment of the resources will be
discussed. This article has a three-fold purpose. First, the article will seek
to establish the importance of the relationship of instrumental equities to
economic efficiency as guides in the construction, participation, and management of regimes. Second, the value of replacing adversarial legal
confrontations with managerial regimes of coordination and of distributive
justice will be emphasized. These envisaged regimes are directed to the
development of the regulated resource and are offered to improve the
requisite techniques for more economical exploitation of the natural resources. Third, the article attempts to establish criteria for the equitable
distribution of the wealth in terms of the equities of proportionality.
The application of equity in international law as an indispensible rectifying factor in the process of decisionmaking, including negotiation
which culminates in agreement,' will be considered in the first part of
this article. Equity will be discussed in terms of (1) the "General Prin2
ciples of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations"; (2) the "General Principles of Law" and the Ex Aequo et Bono clause of Article 38 of the
3
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ); (3) the sources of
*Professor of Law; Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse University College
of Law.
I. For a general discussion of equity in international law, see W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 316-427 (1964).
2. Statute of International Court of Justice [hereinafter cited as ICJ Statute], Art. 38. See also
Goldie, Reconciling Values of Distributive Equity and Management Efficiency in the International
Commons, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ON THE NEW NATURAL RESOURCES 335 (workshop sponsored
by Hague Academy of International Law and United Nations University, 1983).
3. Id., art. 38(2).
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equitable principles applicable to the international negotiating and juridical processes; (4) the relation of international equity to international
law; and (5) the offering of a provisional definition for international equity.
The theses developed will then be applied in subsequent sections on the
negotiation of regimes governing the use of shared resources lying under
seabed areas common to two or more states. Alternative managerial regimes for the exploration and development of continental shelf resources
will be discussed in light of the relevant doctrines of international equity
and law which have emerged and are continuously emerging.
International law has long recognized the dual role of equity. Equity
may serve to mitigate the rigors of the law or, in Aristotle's classic
statement, to restore "the balance of justice when it has been tilted by
the law. 4 Equity, moreover, may act to make adjustments and allocations
outside, or even contrary to, the law. 5 This distinction is reflected in the
generally accepted subsumption of principles and rules of equity of the
ICJ. 6 When the principle of equity is invoked to bring about a decision
"outside" or "contrary" to the law, the consent of the parties is required.
Equity, in this case, can be considered analogous to conciliation or legislation and cannot assume the consent of the parties. To deny to the
parties the right of giving or withholding their consent would be an
infraction of their sovereignty and their political independence.'
EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Equity and the "General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized
Nations"
Equity and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
are sources of rules of decision by the ICJ and are authoritatively provided
4. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHIcs Book V, ch. 10 (J.K.K. Thomson trans. 1955). For a
similar statement with specific reference to international law, see HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS,
PAST AND FUTURE 103 (1944); the Diana (Masher Gardner) Case, 4 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 333, 342-43 (Modern Series) (1931).
5. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 4; HUDSON, supra note 4; Diana case, supra note 4.
6. ICJ Statute, Art. 38.1.c.
7. I have sounded a previous warning against presuming that states' consent can be readily inferred
to exist when their rights may be diminished or the burden of their obligations increased:
In the international arena, attempts to prescribe norms without appropriate notice, communication, interaction and sharing of values impose excessive stresses on the delicate
mutual tolerances which exist at any given time to control the international community's
expectations of acceptable or at least supportable behaviour. When the limits of those
mutual tolerances are transgressed, purported constitutive prescriptions fail to convince
or be credible. Furthermore, pressures to impose prescriptions without establishing the
essentials of common goals and values, mutual consent and shared perspectives and
purposes, burden the international community and its law-evolving processes with stresses
on its acceptability as a system of control and restraint. This bodes ill for the effective
future of other possibly more important developments.
Goldie, International"Constitutionality": State Sovereignty and the Problem of Consent in LEGAL
CHANGE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JULIUS STONE 316, 317 (Blackshield ed. 1983).
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in Article 38.1.c of the Court's Statute.8 The Statute's mission was explained by de Vissche:
The drafters of the Court's Statute considered ["the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations"] as a source of law independent of convention and custom, as belonging in virtue of their
social foundation and rational character to a common legal fund, but
as having acquired through recognition inforo domestico by civilized
nations that positive character that make them rules of law and excludes what has been called the "ideal element" or mere aspiration,
more or less widespread, to what is deemed a desirable organization
of law. 9
Other general principles of law include res judicata, audi alteram
partem,l° reliance," clean hands, good faith, proportionality, 2 and the
direction that a tribunal "look to the substance rather than to the form. " 3
8. This is the formulation of aleana c of Art. 38, para. 1, of the ICJ Statute which provides:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
The above formulation of aleana c. has been quite severely criticized. For example, Judge Ammoun
has observed that the words "recognized by civilized nations" are inherently based on an assumption
of the inequality of the developing countries; he suggested that they be changed to "recognized in
national legal systems." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 132-36.
9. C. DEVISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (rev. ed., Corbett
trns., 1968) citing 2 GENY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE § 170.
10. See, e.g., The Nuclear Test Cases, 1974 I.C.J. 253, 265.
11. For examples of "reliance" and the preclusion of an argument or testimony contradicting a
position held out to another and relied upon by that other, see the Status of Eastern Greenland Case,
1933 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 53 at 36-37 and 69-73; the ICJ's legal appraisal of declarations by
President Pompidou and by the French Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs in an announcement
in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL; The Nuclear Tests Case 1974 I.C.J. 253, 265-71. In the Nuclear Tests
Case, the court said:
In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large . . . its intention effectively to terminate
these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements
and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal
consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of
international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the
relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from
the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral
act must be deduced. . . . [t]he Court holds that these statements constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect.
1974 I.C.J. 253, 269-70.
12. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 53, 54; Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 43-44, 75-76.
13. See, e.g., The Cayuga Indians Arbitration (Great Britain v. United States), 20 AM. J. INT'L
L. 574 (1926); NIELSEN REP. 203, 307 (1926).
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The Roman law maxim, namely inadimplenti non est adimplendum (he
who fails to fulfill his part of an agreement cannot enforce that bargain
against the other party), has also been received into international law. 4
These maxims or doctrines constitute bodies of principles and rules in a
definite concept and reflect basic social values.
Briefly, "general principles of law" arise through the following process.
A developing specific articulation of justice involves claims that create a
demand for its legal implementation. New rules and doctrines are then
forged either by the courts, legislatures, a combination of both, or by
old legal theories gathered around a central idea of justice, thereby creating modalities of that idea's reception into law. After those rules and
doctrines themselves become grouped around a central idea of justice
they become clarified in the process of claim, counterclaim, and accommodation. The idea of justice both articulates the concept which governs
those principles and rules which form the doctrine and provides the determinant of their interrelated grouping, as in a constellation around that
central idea of justice. The reception and implementation of the central
idea of justice into rules and standards constitute part of the necessary
clarification process of society. The dispositive function of reception,
however, is separate from the creative functions of emergence and clarification of legal principles. In both functions, creation and clarification
on the one hand, and reception on the other, legislation is an appropriate
source to identify the evolution of a "general principle of law recognized
by civilized nations." Judicial decisions and the "teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations" are also appropriate
mechanisms to accommodate the evolution of "general principles of law." 5
The "General Principles of Law" and the "Ex Aequo et Bono" Clause
The relation of equity to both positive international law and the ex
aequo et bono clause 6 of the Statute of the ICJ becomes an important
inquiry especially because the ICJ emphasized equitable factors so heavily
14. This maxim is reflected in Anglo-American equity, in the Rule in Cherry v. Boulthee, 4 My
& Cr. 442, 41 Eng. Rep. 171 (ch. 1829) and its progeny. It was stated, for example, by Sargant J.
in Re Peruvian Railway Construction Co., [1915] 2 Ch. 144, 150 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 2 Ch. 442
(C.A.) in the following terms: "When a person entitled to participate in a fund is also bound to
make a contribution in aid of that fund, he cannot be allowed to participate unless and until he has
fulfilled his duty to contribute."
The classical statement of this principle's incorporation into international law is, of course, that
of Judge Anzilotti in the Diversion of Water from the River Meuse Case, 1937 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B,
No. 7 at 50, where he said, of the principle inadimplenti non est adimplendum, that it is "[slo just,
so equitable, so universally recognized, that it must be applied in international relations also."
See also, infra, notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text. See, further, Tacna-Arica Arbitration, 2
R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 929, 943-44.
15. Art. 38.1.d, ICJ Statute.
16. Art. 38, para. 2, ICJ Statute.
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in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.' 7 Professor Bin Cheng 18 has
argued that the "equity" of the ex aequo et bono clause includes "pure
equity ' 9 in all its forms and comprehends equity "not only secundum
legem, and praeter legem, but also, if necessary, contra legem." 20 The
function of equity under Article 38, paragraph .c, is to bring "latent
rules of law to light"'" and is contrasted with the function of equity to
create new rules under paragraph 2: "[M]embers 22of the Committee were
in agreement that a judge should not legislate."
This position may be fruitfully compared with that of Judge Anzilotti, 3
who distinguished between two connotations of equity. He saw equity,
first, as constituting part of "the general principles of international law
recognized by civilized nations" and hence as falling within the scope of
Article 38.1.c of the Court's Statute. Second, however, he considered
decisions rendered under the ex aequo et bono clause as more properly
characterized not as equitable but as the result of compromise. 4
Perhaps a more descriptive term for the equitable principles asserted
under the ex aequo et bono clause is conciliation. Conciliation is a settlement on the basis of one party's claims which are not given and may
even be denied under existing principles or rules of law and equity. A
possible situation where the states concerned empower the Court, by
special agreement, to give a decision ex aequo et bono is described:
[Giving a decision ex aqeuo et bono;] would mean that the Court
would have to decide according to non-legal principles of justice, of
morality, of usefulness, of political prudence, and of common sense,
which a municipal legislator or court would apply in a similar internal
dispute, or which reasonable parties would adopt as their basis in
concluding a treaty. 5
The distinction between equity and conciliation, to which writers attest,
has been generally accepted by courts and arbitral tribunals. Thus the
tribunal in the Rann of Kutch Arbitration stated, in February 1966:
17. 1969 I.C.J. 3.
18. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 19-20 (1953).
19. Id. at 20. See also ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 428 (2d printing 1961)
(discussing the Court's use of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116, as a means
of developing equity "intra legem").
20. CHENG, supra note 18 at 20 n.85.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id.
23. Anzilotti, Dionisio, 1869-1950, Italian jurist, Professor at Palermo, Bologna, and (1911-37)
Rome; judge (1921-30) and president (1928-30). Permanent Court of International Justice. WEBSTER'S
NEW BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 43 (1983).
24. D. ANzILOTrI, CORSO DI DIRrTrO INTERNAZIONALE 64 (1928). See also Habicht, Le Pouvoir
de Juge Internationalde Statuer "Ex Aeuo el Bono," 49 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INT'L DE LA HAYE
RECUEIL DE COURS 281, 284-305 (1949).
25. F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-67 (1959).
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As both Parties have pointed out, equity forms part of International
Law; therefore, the Parties are free to present and develop their cases
with reliance on principles of equity. An international Tribunal will
have the wider power to adjudicate a case ex aequo et bono, and
thus to go outside the bounds of law, only if such power has been
conferred on it by mutual agreement between the Parties. 6
The distinction between equity as a "general principle of law recognized by civilized nations" under Article 38.1.c of the Court's Statute
and the ex aequo et bono clause of Article 38.2 was aptly expressed:
The Court has not been expressly authorized by its Statute to apply
equity as distinguished from law. . . .Article 38 of the Statute expressly directs the application of "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," and in more than one nation principles
of equity have an established place in the legal system. The Court's
recognition of equity as part of international law is in no way restricted by the special power conferred upon it "to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto." [Citations omitted.] It
must be concluded, therefore, that under Article 38 of the Statute,
if not independently of that Article, the Court has some freedom to
consider principles of equity as part of the international law which
it must apply.27
This notion of equity as a general principle of law is contrasted with the
values of ex aequo et bono in the process of decision:
[T]he legal concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable
as law. Moreover, when applying positive international law, a court
may choose among several possible interpretations of the law the
one which appears, in light of the circumstances of the case, to be
closest to the requirements of justice. Application of equitable principles is to be distinguished from a decision ex aequo et bono ...
The task of the Court in the present case is ...bound to apply
equitable principles as part of international law, and to balance up
the various considerations which it regards as relevant in order to
produce an equitable result.2 8
26. India v. Pakistan, 7 I.L.M. 633 (1968).
27. Hudson, J., in his separate concurring opinion in The Diversion of the Waters from the Meuse
Case. 1937 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 70, at 76-77. See generally id. at 76- 79; JENKS, supra note I
at 32526. Arbitration of the "Norwegian Claims Against the United States of America" (Nor. v.
U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 39 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932) (1922). The Tribunal stated, in that case,
that international lawyers generally understand words such as "the principles of law and equity" by
which the parties had agreed to have their differences disposed of to indicate "the general principles
of justice as distinguished from any particular system of jurisprudence of the municipal law of any
State." HAGUE CT. REP. 2d (Scott) 39, 65 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932), 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 362, 384
(1923).
28. Continental Shelf case (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. at 18, 60. See also,
English Channel Continental Shelf Arbitration, Court of Arbitration, The United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic, Decision of 30 June 1977 in which the Court
said "[F]rom the emphasis on 'equitable principles' in customary law that the force of the cardinal
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Finally, the method of determining the content of a specific equitable
principle or rule and qualifying it as a "general principle of law recognized
by civilized nations" received an important clarification in Lord McNair's
separate concurring opinion in the Status of South-West Africa case. He
said that "[T]he true view of the duty of international tribunals ...is
to regard any features of terminology which are reminiscent of the rules
and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles
rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions."29
The Sources of Equitable PrinciplesApplicable to the International
JuridicalProcess
Recourse to the general principles of law first requires abstraction from
the particular, the technical, and the parochial municipal laws of a number
of states when these laws reflect a common underlying policy or value.
The next process involves a synthesis of the common pervading principles
underlying the disparate usages. The process is never a pure and simple
transfer of elements of municipal law into international law.3" A principle
is first derived from common social necessities. It is then determined how
often these necessities recur internationally and call for application of the
same principle. 31 Recourse to the general principles of law can be considered a limited exercise in the policy of the law.32
Equity, however, does not permit a party to demand fulfillment of a
contract which he himself is not ready to fulfill or which he has violated.33
Thus, for example, the Permanent Court of International Justice asserted:
[A] principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international
arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, [is] that one Party cannot
avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligation
principle of 'natural prolongation of territory' is not absolute, but may be subject to qualification in
particular situations." Id. at 168-69.
Writing in Aristotelean terms of "restoring the balance," the Arbitral Tribunal asserted that:
The Court accepts the equitable considerations invoked by the United Kingdom as
carrying a certain weight; and, in its view, they invalidate the proposal of the French
Republic restricting the Channel Islands to a six-mile enclave around the islands,
consisting of a three-mile zone of continental shelf added to their three-mile zone of
territorial sea. They do not, however, appear to the Court sufficient to justify the
disproportion or remove the inbalance in the delimitation of the continental shelf as
between the United Kingdom and the French Republic which adoption of the United
Kingdom's proposal would involve. The Court therefore concludes that the specific
features of the Channel Islands region call for an intermediate solution that effects a
more appropriate and a more equitable balance between their respective claims and
interests of the Parties.
Id. at 173-74.
29. 1950 I.C.J. 128, at 148.
30. DE VISSCHER, supra note 9, at 400.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.at 497 n.66. DE VISSCHER cites from Anzilotti's opinion as: Judgment of June 28, 1937,
Case of the Meuse Canals, P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 70 at 50, 77.
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or has not had recourse to some means of redress, if the former Party
has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the
obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal which
would have been open to him.34
[I]t is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation
to make reparation.35
Finally, the ICJ has articulated territorial state's peacetime responsibilities of vigilance and care: "[c]ertain general and well recognized
principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more
exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime
communications; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." 36
Rules, principles, doctrines, or institutions are not examined for external similarities, but for common underlying policies and values. This
process of developing general principles of law fulfills several important
functions. First, the principles of law become the source of various rules
of law, not merely repetitive expressions of these principles.3 7 Second,
juridical principles which interpret and apply the rules of law are developed. 38 Third, the principles of law can be applied directly to the facts
of the case wherever there is no formulated rule governing the matter.39
In international law, where precisely formulated rules are few, this last
function of general principles of law acquires special significance and
has contributed greatly toward defining the legal relations between States. 4'
The nature of these principles is not inherent in any particular system of
law, but is common to them all. 4
The Relation of InternationalEquity to InternationalLaw42
Unlike English equity which developed in the Court of Chancery and
wields the weapon of the common injunction against those who sought
to enforce unconscionably obtained rights at common law, and unlike the
Roman jus gentium which was the child of the Praeter Peregrinus, a
different magistrate from the official who administered the law governing
34. Factory at Chorzow (Jurisdiction) Case, 1927 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 9, at 31.
35. 1928 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 17, at 29.
36. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22. In that case the Court said: "This indirect evidence
is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions." Id. at 18.
37. CHENG, supra note 18, at 390.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The term "international equity" is used to mean the equitable rules accepted under Article
38.1.c.
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the relations of Roman citizens (the Praetor Urbanus), 3 equity in international law is and always has been part and parcel of the law administered
by international courts and tribunals. Equity operates as an ameliorating
and adjusting factor in the decisionmaking process of international law,
without reference to an independent international jurisprudence or a separate tribunal.
The sources of international equity are channelled through the creative
application of Article 38.1 .c of the ICJ's Statute which is a collection or
category of general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations.' Given this provenance, international equity operates symbiotically with the two sources of law which precede it in Article 38, namely,
treaty and custom. Equitable values which have generally emerged, however, are available to temper the interpretation and application of treaties."
Equity clearly can operate both secundum legem and praeter legem when
applied to modify treaty effects. Whether equity can also operate contra
legem, however, raises the issue of whether the Court seeks to ameliorate
the impact of obsolete and poten'tially unjust positive law rules, or whether
the Court is operating outside the scope of its permitted jurisdiction
altogether and is, therefore, transforming itself into a conciliation commission without the parties' consent.' This would, of course, be impermissible. On the other hand, creativity in fashioning a case's rules of
decision is not necessarily precluded.
A ProvisionalDefinition
Contingently, international equity may be defined as the compendium
of concepts supporting, promoting, and implementing those entitlements,
benefits, and satisfactions which are validated by society's contemporary
sense of justice and fairness. In international law, these concepts reflect
the basic principles of jurisprudence and legislation which articulate and
apply justice, reason, and values which are extensively diffused throughout the major legal systems of the world today. International equity, in
the sense used in this article, further operates to temper the rigors of
positive international law's application to those specific situations where
generalizations would produce anomalies, inequities, or injustices, or, in
Aristotle's terms, "imbalances." 4 7
43. For a comparison of Roman and English equity in their formative years, see SIR. H. MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 48-78 (Sir. F. Pollock ed. 1906).
44. See, e.g., supra notes 27 and 29 and accompanying text. This was also the underlying
assumption of the ICJ's references to equity in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.
45. As illustrated in the classic case of The Diversion of the Waters of the Meuse, see supra note
27 and accompanying text.
46. See supra, the distinction made in the text accompanying notes 17-30.
47. ARISTOTLE, supra note 4.
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While international equity may operate secundum legem, praeter legem, intra legem48 and even, under special circumstances, contra legem
by avoiding or excluding the application of an otherwise appropriate rule
rather than judicially nullifying or overruling it, equity does not subjugate
the law.49 Secondly, international equity is not a separate jurisprudence.
It still should be seen as acting as a reforming emollient and a "gloss"
upon the rules and institutions of the traditional positive law.5" International equity should also be seen as merging into international law, thus
ensuring its application in individual cases as well as its progressive
development as a body of jurisprudence. The equitable concepts stressed
by the ICJ in the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases" effectively operated
both as a gloss upon the law and as merging equity into international law
to ensure progressive development. The relevant equitable concepts which
developed and gave new depth to the continental shelf doctrine generally
emphasized the claims of justice and utility and were not perceived as
overriding customary law. Equitable concepts, moreover, tempered the
rigors which would have resulted in the special circumstances of the
North Sea's configuration had an alternative application of the continental
shelf doctrine been used.52 Finally, because international equity is still in
its formative stages, it would be unjust to the ICJ to ignore the importance
of its pioneering efforts of reasoning in terms of specific wealth-creative,
utilitarian equities in the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases," the Fisheries
Jurisdiction cases, 54 and the ContinentalShelf (Tunisia/LibyanArab Jamahiriya) case."
INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES AND INDIVIDUAL STATES' CLAIMS TO
NEW AVAILABLE NATURAL RESOURCES
The review which follows will stress that the principles of equity are
included in the principles of positive international law. Secondly, principles involving abuse of rights, unjust enrichment, reliance, conscience,
reciprocity, the fulfillment of obligations and expectations, and knowledge
through notice lie at the heart of not only English equity, but also of
international and civil law equity. Lastly, then, principles of equity operate
mutatis mutandis at the transnational and domestic, as well as the international level.
48. For this interesting concept, see ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 428.
49. JENKS, supra note 1, at 425.
50. MAITLAND, EQurrY (2d rev. ed. 1936).
51. 1969 I.C.J. 3.
52. 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 52. See also at 50.
53. 1969 I.C.J. 3.
54. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland),
1974 I.C.J. 3. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), 1974
I.C.J. 175, at 196.
55. 1982 I.C.J. 18.

July 1985]

TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

A Preliminary Explanation and an Example
The equitable principles adumbrated in the following paragraphs refer
to the notion of equity as instrumental in wealth-creation6 The origin
of instrumental equities, accordingly, is from numerous sources: international and domestic case law, domestic legislation, and the international
and domestic law of treaties.
To take an example from a field quite distinct from that under review,
at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) passed a resolution calling a conference
to be held in 1985 for the purpose of finding an agreed formula, or at
least an approach, to guarantee "for all countries, equitable access to the
geostationary satellite orbit and space service frequencies." 57 The conference may provide a satellite service-type plan for satellite communications and revise existing conflict resolution procedures. Indeed, experts
in the field perceive a '5possible
conflict of values: those reflected in the
"rationing approach" 8 and those espousing the "engineering approach." 5 9 The present counterpoint of claims arises from recent developments in international law governing the distribution of access to the
simultaneous exploitation of both the geostationary orbit and the electromagnetic spectrum. Critics of the present system with its protection of
existing ("grandfather") rights tend to underscore dissatisfaction with
existing norms in the context of both conflict resolution procedures and
the legal norms governing access to geostationary orbital positions.' On
the other hand, a country-by-country allocation approach is criticized as
leading to wasteful use or non-use of at least some of the available
segments of the geostationary orbit.6 The dilemma is that the current
system is efficient, and maximizes the useful employment of equatorial
orbital positions needed for geostationary satellites. It is, on the other
hand, regarded as inequitable since there appears to be little deference,
if any, to claims of distributive justice. Discussion of this dilemma will
be deferred to a later analysis of how the instrumental equities of wealth
creation are to be fruitfully managed in a context which can achieve a
56. Discussion of the relationship between distributive justice and equity will be reserved for
later paragraphs.
57. Resolution No. 3, Relating to the use of the GeostationarySatellite Orbit and to the Planning
of Space Services Utilizing It, in INTERNATINAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE
WORLD ADINmISTRATivE RADIO CONFERENCE, GENEVA, 1979, 744-45 (1980).
58. See, e.g., Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 AM. J. Ir'L L.
56, 67-70, 73 (1982). See also D. Smith, Conflict Resolution in Outer Space: International Law
and Policy 13-14 (1982) (unpublished paper presented at the Hague Academy of International Law
Workshop on the Resolution of Disputes over New Natural Resources, November 8-10, 1982).
59. Rothblatt, supra note 58, at 67-70.
60. Rothblatt, id. at 67-73; see also Goldie, supra note 2, at 347-48.
61. Rothblatt, id. Goldie, id.
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minimal level of distributive justice, or at least reduce tensions which
could otherwise arise from perceived senses of injustice.62
Abuse of Rights (and Unjust Enrichment Arising Therefrom)
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases,63 the ICJ clearly enunciated the
policy of international law regarding the perceived inequities of misusing
rights. The Court refused to recognize the transformation of a right,
validly asserted to vindicate one purpose, to achieve a different purpose
which would deny another state's valid and subsisting rights. 4 The Court
further disallowed the abuse of preferential fishing rights to exclude the
established fishing rights of other states by referring to equity: "[I]n order

to reach an equitable solution of the present dispute it is necessary that
the preferential fishing rights of Iceland, as a State specially dependent
on coastal fisheries, be reconciled with the traditional fishing rights of
the Applicant." 65
In addition to the equities of unjust enrichment prominent in the judgment, values stemming from reliance and variously called "laches," "treu
und glauben" (trust and confidence), or confiance (as an aspect of "preclusion") also played an important role in evaluating the historic rights
to the Icelandic Fishery of the English and German fishing communities
whose traditional and historic claims the Court so unequivocally vindicated. Similarly, arbitration tribunals have not allowed unjust enrichment
which might arise from a refusal to fulfill an obligation, or from redefinition of a right which changes the basis of the obligation. 6
62. See infra section entitled Possible Alternative Regimes.
63. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland),
1974 I.C.J. 3, at 27-28. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 175, at 196.
64. The Court said:
The concept of preferential rights is not compatible with the exclusion of all fishing
activities of other States. A coastal State entitled a preferential right is not free,
unilaterally and according to its one uncontrolled discretion, to determine the extent
of those rights. The characterization of the coastal State's rights as preferential implies
a certain priority, but cannot imply the extinction of the concurrent rights of other
States, and particularly of a State which, like the Applicant, has for many years been
engaged in fishing in the waters in question, such fishing activity being important to
the economy of the country concerned. The coastal State has to take into account and
pay regard to the position of such other States, particularly when they have established
an economic dependence on the same fishing grounds. Accordingly, the fact that Iceland
is entitled to claim preferential rights does not suffice to justify its claim unilaterally
to exclude the Applicant's fishing vessels from all fishing activity in the waters beyond
the limits agreed to in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
65. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland),
1974 I.C.J. 3, at 30.
66. The Lena Goldfields Arbitration (Lena Goldfields v. Russia), [1929-30] ANN. Di. 3 (Case
No. 1,1930); United Dredging Company Case (United States v. Mexico) 4 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS
263 (General Claims Commission 1927); Union Land Company Case, 4 MOORE, ADJUDICATIONS,
supra note 4, at 3434, 3452-53 (1839). See also JENKS, supra note 1,at 417. But cf. Dickson Car
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Reliance and Notice as Equities
Conduct stemming from perception or knowledge of a situation turns
on the mode of information whereby that knowledge was imparted or
that perception received. When that knowledge or perception has been
imparted to the actor through the words or conduct of another, that other
is responsible towards the actor, at least to the extent that the information
should not have been fraudulently or negligently imparted. Thereafter
that other party should not be permitted unilaterally to change the actor's
position, or the posture of the factual situation regarding which the knowledge was imparted. To change the situation unilaterally, either in whole
or in part, or to give misleading, partial or incomplete information, is to
act inequitably whenever the actor has, in reliance and good faith, altered
his position on the assumption of the truth of what he was led to understand
or believe. The faith of the actor has its counterpart in the need for
conscience, and for conscionable conduct, on the part of the other party.67
Alternatively, the knowledge which may be attributed to an actor in
determining, or appraising, his rights is neither more nor less than the
knowledge imparted. The actor is entitled to rely on the information of
which he has been made aware and cannot be held to know of other
information or facts. Nor can his rights be circumscribed by virtue of the
existence of facts or events of which he was not apprised. A reasonable
inquiry, however, following imparted or notified information might reveal
further data. If conscionable conduct were to call for such further reasonable inquiry then, clearly, the actor should be held responsible for
failure to meet that standard. The equities of such imputed notice on the
basis of imparted knowledge are clear and can only be invoked when the
actor's failure to inquire was itself inequitable and when the information
would have been available upon diligent inquiry.
The Equities of Estoppel and Laches
The concepts of equitable estoppel and laches emerge from the same
fundamental ideas of reliance, confidence, the duty to give notice, and
the attribution of knowledge in the one to whom notice is given. Equitable
estoppel in Anglo-American equity has been defined as follows: "A party
is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to the detriment of
Wheel Company Case (United States v. Mexico), 4 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 669, at 676 (General
Claims Commission, 1931).
67. In domestic and transnational commercial law this is known as the doctrine of notice. In
public international law, reliance and notice are reflected in the transnational commercial arbitrations
of the Lena Goldfields Arbitration, [19291 ANN. DIG. 3 (Case No. 1, 1930), and the California
Asiatic Oil Company and the Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. the Libyan Arab Republic,
53 INT'L L. REP. 389 (1979), I.L.M. (Dupuy, Sole Arbitrator, 1977). Notice and reliance are found
in international tribunal decisions. See International Court of Justice in the South-West Africa Advisory Opinions, 1950 I.C.J. 128; 1962 I.C.J. 319.
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another party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted
accordingly ... ""
Estoppel in international law was similarly defined by the Permanent
Court of International Justice, in the Chorzow Factory case. 6 An extension of the principle of estoppel is that a state's intention to be bound by
its unilateral acts is to be determined by the interpretation of the act.7 °
Moreover, when a state makes a statement limiting its freedom of action,
that statement is to be restrictively interpreted. 7' Such statements require
no essential form and "[w]hether a statement is made orally or in writing
"...,,72
The binding character of an inmakes no essential difference .
ternational obligation assumed by unilateral declaration is based on good
faith. 73 "Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that
the obligation thus created be respected. , 74 Public statements made by a
State's governmental officials may also create an obligation on the part
of that State. The precise nature and limits of the obligation "must be
understood in accordance with the actual terms in which they have been
publicly expressed." 75
68. Estoppel is a bar or impediment which precludes allegation or denial of a certain state
of facts in consequence of previous allegation, or denial or conduct or admission or
adjudication of the matter in a court of law. It operates to put party entitled to its
benefit in same position as if the thing represented were true.
BLACK's LAW DIcrIONARY 494 (5th ed. 1979).
69.
[O]ne Party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some
obligation, or has not had recourse to some means of redress, if the former Party has,
by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the obligation in question, or
from having recourse to the tribunal which would have been open to him.
1927 P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 9, at 31. See also Danzig Railway Officials, Avisory Opinion, 1928
Ps-I 2.C.I.J. Series B, No. 15, at 27; Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, Advisory
Opinion, 1927 P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 14, at 23; and the Societe Commerciale de Belgique Case,
1939 P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 78, at 176. See also Diversion of the River Meuse Case, 1937 P.C.I.J.
Ser. A/B No. 70, at 25, where the Permanent Court applied the principle "allegans contraria non
audiendus est"; and the Nuclear Test Case, 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267-72 (Opinion of the Court), 285
(separate opinion of Judge Gros). See also id. at 314 (separate Opinion of Judge Petren).
70. 1974 I.C.J. 253 at 267-68. See also the Temple at Preah Viher Case, 1961 I.C.J. 3 at 311,
quoted in the Nuclear Tests Case, 1974 I.C.J. 253 at 268. In the Nuclear Tests Case the Court added:
"One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever
their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in particular in an age when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly
essential."
71. 1974 I.C.J. 253 at 267-68.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 268.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 270. Statements were made, respectively, on 25 July 1974 by the President of the
French Republic; on 16 August and 11 October 1974 by that country's Minister of Defense; and on
25 September 1974, in the General Assembly of the United Nations by its Minister for Foreign
Affairs. See ICJ's legal appraisal, supra note 11.
The ICJ's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, said, with regard to a juridically rather similar unilateral statement:
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In the InternationalStatus of South-West Africa case, 76 the ICJ found
that certain declarations made by the Government of the Union of South
Africa (now the Republic of South Africa) constituted a recognition on
its part of an obligation to submit to continued supervision in accordance
with the Mandate. The Court added: "Interpretations placed upon legal
instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive as to their
meaning, have considerable probative value when they contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument."" In sum,
international law and transnational commercial law, like Anglo-American
equity, impose an obligation upon a state whose words or conduct have
led others to rely upon it and alter their position in that reliance, to be
thereupon bound by its own acts.
The underlying moral values of good faith and reliance also form the
foundation of the doctrine of laches. The concept of laches is "based
upon a maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber
on their rights." 7 8 Laches is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim
which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the adverse party, and operates as a bar in a court of equity.79
The principle of "extinctive prescription," that is, the barring of claims
in international law through the lapse of time, "has been applied by
arbitration tribunals in a number of cases." 8 The justification of this
international law concept, furthermore, is rooted in equitable premises,
as stated by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. "Delay in the prosecution of a claim
once notified to the defendant State is not so likely to prove fatal to the
success of the claim as delay in its original notification, as one of the
main justifications of the principle is to avoid the embarassment of the
defendant by reason of his inability to obtain evidence in regard to a
What Denmark desired to obtain from Norway was that the latter should do nothing
to obstruct Danish plans in regard to Greenland. The declaration which the Minister
for Foreign Affairs gave on July 22, 1919, on behalf of the Norwegian Government,
was definitely affirmative: "I told the Danish Minister today that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty in the settlement of this question."
The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature given by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to a request by
the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within
his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.
1933 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B No. 53, at 71. The Court characterized the "Ihlen Declaration" as "unconditional and definitive." Id. at 72.
76. 1950 I.C.J. 128.
77. Id. at 135-36. For similar points of view in both the Permanent Court and the present Court
to that quoted in the text, see Advisory Opinion Concerning the Competency of the International
Labour Organization, 1922 P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 2, at 41; Advisory Opinion on the Competence
of the General Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 9; and the case
concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco, 1952 I.C.J. 176 at 200.
78. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 787 (5th ed. 1979).
79. Id.
80. 1 LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (PEACE) 349-50 (8th ed. 1955). For a list
of cases exemplifying the proposition in the text, see id.
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claim of which he only became aware when it was already stale.""' The
underlying policy (namely that of reliance) of extinctive prescription in
international law "resembles the laches, or acquiescence, of English
Equity rather than the statutory limits governing Common Law claims, "82
in that a fixed period of time is not required, but an alternation of position,
a detrimental reliance, is.
In other terms, consider A who possesses a right unknown, at least in
its relevant particulars, to B. B then, because of A's inaction, alters his
(B's) position by the investment of time, effort, money, and technological
skills, in pursuing what he (B) considers to be his (B's) right. A is then
said to have at least permitted B to believe that A would acquiesce in
and accept B's activity and investment. Accordingly, A cannot later argue
that B's good faith efforts were invalid to create a right enuring to B on
account of A's pre-existing right. Should A have wished to preclude B's
activity from ripening into a vested entitlement, A should have given
timely notice to B of his (A's) intention to activate his pre-existing right.
Here again the basic values of equity involving reliance, notice, and good
faith create the applicable principle. A far different outcome, of course,
results when B invades A's right with knowledge thereof and merely
anticipates inaction by A. In such a case, equity recognizes A's right to
assert claim both to his original entitlement and to B's improvements
thereof.83 In addition to vindicating conscionable behavior and reprobating
unconscionable conduct, the equities of reliance and good faith constitute
instruments for creating the environment of stability and predictability
necessary for wealth creation.
Proportionalityas an Equity
The concept of proportionality as an equitable principle was articulated
by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases." The states were
81. Id.
82. Id. at 349 n.4.
83. The old English case of Ramsden v. Dyson, [1866] L.R. I H.L. 129, illustrates this point
with the following propositions:
(a) If a stranger begins to build on land supposing it to be his own, and the real
owner, perceiving his mistake, abstains from setting him right, and leaves him to
persevere in his error, equity will not afterwards allow the real owner to assert his title
to the land; and
(b) But if a stranger builds on land knowing it to be the property of another, equity
will not prevent the real owner from afterwards claiming the land, with the benefit of
all the expenditures upon it.
ld..
For an equivalent theory in international law, see LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND
ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 87-89 (1927), and the cases, state practice and agreements
there cited. See also the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case, 1925 P.C.I.J. Series
A, No. 6, at 19.
84. 1969 I.C.J. 3. See also id.at 54.
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called upon to recognize a reasonable degree of proportionality to determine "the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines. 8 5 Proportionality
is distinguishable from the argument that each state should "receive a
just and equitable share" of the divisible area.86 The ICJ rejected this
argument because it was based on a premise of distributive justice which
would control the partitioning of an area held in common or undivided
shares. The Court saw the continental shelf of each North Sea state as
already appurtenant to that state and only the problem of demarcation of
the boundaries remained. The Federal Republic of Germany argued for
the distribution of a common property in terms of equitable shares, whereas
the ICJ held its function was the determination of the boundaries between
the separate and individually controlled areas which constituted the several
coastal states' appurtenant continental shelves. In these circumstances,
the Court saw equity as having an important role in the delimitation of
boundaries. Equity was not to provide the criteria of "fair shares" or
equality in the sense of parity or of levelling but, rather, to correct
anomalies.87 Thus the Court said:
Equity does not necesesarily imply equality. There can never be a
question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does not require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted an area
of continental shelf, any more than there could be a question of
rendering the situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar
to that of a State with a restricted coastline. Equality is to be reckoned
85. 1969 I.C.J. 3, 52.
86. Note that Germany contended that
[A]n equitable apportionment of the continental shelf of the North Sea among the
surrounding States could not be achieved by determining the boundary lines between
each pair of adjacent or opposite States as an isolated act. The boundary problem must
rather be considered as a joint concern of all North Sea States, taking into account
the effect of each boundary on the apportionment as a whole.
Reply of Federal Republic of Germany, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 389,
423 (1968). See also 1 Pleadings at 76. Be that as it may, the Federal Republic's view of distributive
justice and equity was encapsulated in th following thesis:
(I) In apportioning the continental shelf among coastal States, the breadth of their
coastal frontage facing the North Sea should be the principal criterion for evaluating
whether the area allocated to one of these States is a just and equitable share.
(II) The most equitable apportionment of the continental shelf among the coastal
States would be a sectoral division based on the breadth of their coastal frontage facing
the North Sea.
(III) As to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the Parties, the equidistance method cannot find application, since it would not apportion a just and
equitable share to the Federal Republic of Germany.
(IV) The boundary line dividing the continental shelf between the Parties must be
settled by agreement in accordance with the judgment of the Court.
1 Pleadings at 89.
87. On the history of equity as the "correction of anomalies," see MAINE, supra note 44, at 62-
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within the same plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as these
that equity could remedy. 8
The ICJ reviewed equity and proportionality as providing criteria to
determine the location of boundaries rather than functioning as simple
distributive justice.
A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a reasonable
degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to
equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the
continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths
of their respective coastlines,-these being measured according to
their general direction in order to establish the necessary balance
between States with straight, and those with markedly concave or
convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer
proportions."
The notion of equity as a means of correcting anomalies in the delimitation
of the continental shelf boundaries is reinforced by the Court's assertion
that "[i]t is therefore not a question of totally refashioning geography
whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situation of
quasi-equality as between a number of States, of abating the effects of
an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of
treatment could result. "9

The ICJ's judgment of the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases, however,
is not in harmony with the perception of proportionality which Professor
J.P.A. Francois quoted in his Memorandum on the Regime of the High
Seas91 for the International Law Commission. Professor Francois suggested that the extent "des eaux juridictionelles'" of each state be proportionate to population density, the extent of the national territory, and
the length of its coastline. 92 Indeed, this thesis of proportionality, like the
argument of the Federal Republic of Germany claiming that each state
should receive "a just and equitable share" of the area to be apportioned
amongst them, would appear to follow a different path from that trodden
by the Court.
More recently the ICJ, in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)case 93 referred to its analysis of proportionality in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases:
1969 LC.J. 3, at 49-50.
1969 I.C.J. 3, at 52.
1969 I.C.J. 3, at 50.
U.N. Doc. AICN. 4/32, [1950] 2 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N 67 (1950).
92. Id. at 110-11, citing Azcarraga, Los Derechos Sobre laPlatiforma Submarina, 2 REVISTA
88.
89.
90.
91.

ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTERNACINALE 47 (1949).

93. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, 1982 I.C.J. 4.
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It should be reaffirmed that the continental shelf, in the legal sense,
does not include the sea-bed areas below territorial and internal
waters; but the question is not one of definition but proportionality
as a function of equity. .

.

.Furthermore, the element of propor-

tionality is related to lengths of the coasts of the States concerned,
not to straight baselines drawn round those coasts. The question
raised by Tunisia: "how could the equitable character of a delimitation of the continental shelf be determined by reference to the degree
of proportionality between areas which are not the subject of that
delimitation?" is beside the point; since it is a question of proportionality, the only absolute requirement of equity is that one should
compare like with like.'

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
Selected pronouncements of the International Court of Justice and its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have been
reviewed to extract from them evidence of an unfolding equity jurisprudence enriching public international law and the decisional process of
international tribunals in general. A number of vital doctrines have been
identified. In the present section these doctrines provide the criteria for
identifying appropriate managerial regimes established, or advocated, for
the purpose of equitably utilizing and distributing the benefits of the
resources contained in common geological structures which lie athwart
the boundaries separating the continental shelves of two or more states.
The proposed regimes are not concerned with establishing boundaries by
reference to equitable principles, as was called for in the North Sea
ContinentalShelf cases,95 but are more concerned with the management,
exploitation, and distribution of resources to be found in common geological structures.96 The suggested model of the "managerial or administrative conciliation regime" 97 and the proposal for a multinational public
enterprise9" have some analogies to offer to the development of a common
regime for exploring or exploiting the mineral resources of common
continental shelf resources. These possible regimes are discussed in the
light of: (1) goals; (2) areas; (3) participants; and (4) measures.
94. 1982 I.C.J. 18, 76 (emphasis added).
95. North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
96. Analogies for such common regimes may be provided by fisheries agreements. For example,
the type of fisheries regime denominated the "agent state" regime may fruitfully provide valuable
analogies for framing regimes for working common mineral deposits. See Goldie, The Oceans'
Resources and InternationalLaw-Possible Developments in Regional Fisheries Management, 8
COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 44-45 (1969).
97. Id. at 45-46.
98. Id. at 46-51.
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Goals
In the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases," Judge Padillo Nervo, in an
independent concurring opinion, formulated the purpose of the continental
shelf doctrine and convention:
The purpose of the continental shelf doctrine and of the Convention
is to contribute to a world order, in the foreseeable rush for oil and
mineral resources, to avoid dangerous confrontation among States
and to protect smaller nations from the pressure of force, economic
or political, from greater or stronger States." °
If a regime's main function is merely the settlement of boundaries,
this formulation of purpose may suffice. Distributive managerial regimes,
however, should be guided by more affirmative goals which include: (1)
improvement of techniques to optimize world welfare and the rewards
which the continental shelf mining industry may offer to states participating in it; (2) facilitation of participating states' domestic policies,
whether the policies are the creation of employment opportunities or the
expectation that the deep-ocean mining activities will contribute to those
state's economies either by earning foreign currency or by preventing
importation of such necessary items as oil and gas; (3) assurance that
equities arising from reliance, notice (including estoppel and laches),
proportionality, and unjust enrichment are adequately provided for; and
(4) generation of an economic value in the right to mine or drill in the
common continental shelf areas lying between two or more states made
subject to the regime by limiting access thereto. This economic value
could be recovered for the regime in the form of license fees, royalties,
or taxes. Such resources could be applied on behalf of the mining regime
as a whole to defray such costs as research, administration, and control.
Surpluses should also be available for general purposes both within and
without if the participating states agree.
Controlling access to a given deposit could be the strategy best suited
for realizing these additional affirmative goals, in most cases. Controlling
access to a particular deposit calls for the joint action of all states participating in the regime to delegate, to a common regulatory authority
and for the benefit of all, a part of each one's separate authority and, in
particular, the pre-existing right of each to act preemptively. As the whole
industry increases in value, so will the share of each participating state.
Such a share could exceed in value what any one state might have previously accrued by unilateral preemptive action at the expense of all the
others. The goals could best be achieved by a functional integration of
the resource's uses by a supranational agency.
99. North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3.
100. 1969 I.C.1. 3, 92.
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Areas
The possible areas of regimes which can be offered as alternatives to
one which simply provides the means for carving up state's exclusive
submarine zones will vary with the choices made by the participating
states. For shallow submarine areas adjacent to two or more states the
regime could optimally include the whole of the region in question; or it
could be limited to the areas of the states prepared to negotiate and
conclude a convention for the regulation of the area governed by that
agreement. Finally, the areas brought under a managerial regime might
include those where the exploitation of a single geological structure extends across a continental shelf boundary, thereby calling for a single
common exploitation activity for purposes of efficiency and conflict avoidance.
Participants
The participants of a supranational regional managerial regime regulating the exploration and exploitation of the whole of a continental shelf
region's resources should be limited to the coastal states agreeing to
establish the regime. If the regime is limited to a disputed area or, alternatively, to the total shelf region (or portions only thereof), participation in the regime should be limited to those nations. When a managerial
regime is established to regulate a single geological structure extending
into two or more national shelf regions, then its participants should only
include those states in whose submarine areas the structure exists, and
which also agree to establish the regime. An outside state could be added
by agreement of all the others on the basis of its technological, managerial,
capital investment, or other contributions.
Measures
A managerial regime, irrespective of the area it covers, should acknowledge the importance of technological and economic research. The
yield from continental shelf oil drilling and mining should not only be
regulated by engineering criteria but also by considerations which ensure
the optimum uses of the deposit's mineral resources. All forms of discrimination, moreover, between enterprises on the basis of nationality
should be eliminated, provided the enterprise has the support of at least
one of the states participating in the regime.
Alternative Regimes
While the focus of this article is managerial regimes governing common
continental shelf mineral deposits, arguments and ideas from existing
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fisheries regimes,1° 1 to the extent they are relevant, are discussed for the
purpose of enriching and inspiring possibilities of acceptable and productive blueprints for the exploration and use of common mineral resources.
Agent State
' 10 2
The type of fisheries regime which has been denominated "agent state"
has some useful parallels for the development of a regime limiting access
to a common mineral deposit which extends beyond a common continental
shelf boundary.
Fisheriesand the 'Agent State" Model
The Fur Seal Convention between Russia, Japan, the United States,
Great Britain, and Canada"°3 established the leading example of this type
of regime.
[The Fur Seal Convention] is unique among all conservation treaties
in that it appoints two "agents"-the United States and Russia-to
carry out the management and harvesting of the herds on their islands.
Pelagic sealing is prohibited, and provision is made for sharing the
proceeds amongst the signatories. In effect, the agreement creates
sole ownership in each of the two areas."o
One or more of the participating states may be accepted as the "fishing
agents" of a community of states in a regime. The other members' claims
to participate are then converted into claims for compensation. There is
no inherent reason, however, why managerial regimes could not consist
of all the states of a region or even of the world, provided they have a
resource to contribute or a concrete interest to serve. Some states might
then choose to trade their claims to a share in the resource for other gains
which might be collateral to or independent of it. This should be discouraged. Accordingly, the principle of abstention," 5 a fisheries concept,
could be further developed. Abstention relates to the appointment of, and
the distribution of, vested equitable rewards to the regimes' "agent states."
The principle of abstention, moreover, can be used to establish the tradeoffs utilized to satisfy claims merely for participation in the regime.
101. See, e.g., Goldie, supra note 97.
102. F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 196 (1965).
103. The first of these treaties, the Convention Between the United States and Other Powers
Providing for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, was signed July 7, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542.
The most recent was signed in 1957 and amended in 1963. See Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, signed Feb. 9, 1957, [1957] 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948,
314 U.N.T.S. 105, and the Protocol Amending the Interim Convention ....
done Oct. 8, 1963,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 316, T.IA.S. No. 5558, 494 U.N.T.S. 303.
104. CHRISTY & Scorr, supra note 102, at 196.
105. Goldie, supra note 96, at 28-31, 45.
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The "Essential Unity of a Deposit of Oil and Gas""
Measures for protecting oil deposits from wasteful practices, 0 7 such
as legislation in the United States,' 0 8 Canada," and the United Kingdom,
reflect a policy of unitization."' Unitization is the policy of maintaining
the "essential unity of a deposit of oil and gas."" 2 The United Nations
Secretariat has also promoted the policy goal of the "essential unity of
a deposit."" ' 3 Support for this policy is also reflected in scholarly writings," 4 and in at least six international agreements." 5 The policy has,
106. For the provenance of this term, and especially for the U.N. Secretariat's use of it early in
the thinking and discussion of the utilization of the resources of a continental shelf region which
are to be found on both sides of an international boundary line, see U.N. Secretariat Memorandum
on the Regime of the High Seas 109, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/32 (mimeo July 14, 1959), [1950] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 67, 112 [hereinafter cited as A/CN.4/32]. Since the publication of A/CN.4/32,
the term has tended to become as much the accepted term in international law as "unitization" has
become for an analogous private law situation in American oil and gas municipal law.
107. Deriving from the application of the "Rule of Capture" to the winning of oil and gas. See
Westmoreland & Cambridge Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889). See also
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). For a classic statement of the "Rule of Capture"
and its correlative offset rule, see Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A.
801 (1907).
108. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1982), 41 Stat. 437 (1964); 60 Stat. 952, as amended 68 Stat. 583, 58485 (1954) and 74 Stat. 780 (1960) 30 U.S.C. § 2260) (1964). See also Mineral Leasing Act for
Acquired Lands of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1982).
For a history of the development of § 17(b) and its social background, see MYERS, THE LAW OF
POOLING AND UNrrizATION, VOLUNTARY-COMPULSORY 294-97 (1957). The Federal Regulations pursuant to the Act are the Unit Plan Regulations, 16 Fed. Reg. 77 (1951), 43 C.F.R. 192.20, 192.21
(1951).
109. See, e.g., Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1955, SASK. STAT. c.88 § 35; Oil and Gas
Resources Conservation Act of 1952, REV. ALTA. STAT. c. 46.
110. Great Britain, Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations
1964, Schedule 2 (Model Clauses for Production Licenses), cl. 19, Stat. Instr. 1964, No. 708.
111. "Unitization" is the term used in American oil and gas law to reflect the idea of the "essential
unity of a deposit of oil and gas." It is distinct from the idea of "pooling" (which means the "bringing
together of small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well permit under applicable spacing rules"),
6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 901, at 2 (1964). "Unitization" means "the joint operation
of all or some part of the producing reservoir." Id. at 3.
112. Supra note 106.
113. See supra note 106.
114. See, e.g., A/CN.4/32, supra note 106, at 109; Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine
Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 410 n.4 (1950); Mouton, The Continental Shelf, 85 HAGUE
ACAD. INT'L L. 345, 421-23 (1954-I).
This writer, however, feels compelled to doubt Lauterpacht's statement that "[iut will be noted
that the phenomenon of common pools independent of political boundaries is relied upon in the
recitals of the Proclamation of the United States of 1945." There would appear to be no direct
reference to such a phenomenon in the recital to which Lauterpacht referred. Furthermore, the federal
policy in these matters, as embodied in § 17(b) of the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §2260)
(1964), was not added to the domestic legislation until the year following President Truman's
Continental Shelf Proclamation in 1945.
For an early international arbitration (in 1909) recognizing the principle of the unity of a resource
(crustaceans), see Grisbadarna Case, 13 U.N.R.I.A.A. 147, Hague Ct, Rep. (Scott) 121 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1911), 4 AM. J. INTL L. 226 (1910) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909).
115. See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Relating to the Exploration
of Single Geological Structures Extending Across the Dividing Line on the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea, Netherlands No. I (1965). Cmnd. No. 2830.
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however, been given different interpretations. Thus, for example, Admiral
Mouton observed: "We believe that the principle . . .that a dividing
boundary-line should not cross an oil pool ...is a guide for countries
in framing their delimitation
agreements or for the arbitrator who is called
'' 6
in in the case of dispute. 1
The first two articles of the United Kingdom-Netherlands Single Structure Agreement'17 provide:
Article 1

If any single geological mineral oil or natural gas structure or field
extends across the dividing line and the part of such structure or field
which is situated on one side of the dividing line is exploitable,
wholly or in part, from the other side of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties will seek to reach agreement as to the manner in
which the structure or field shall be most effectively exploited and
the manner in which the costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be
apportioned, after having invited the licensees concerned, if any, to
submit agreed proposals to this effect.
Article 2

Where a structure or field referred to in Article 1 of this Agreement
is such that failure to reach agreement between the Contracting Parties
would prevent maximum ultimate recovery of the deposit or lead to
unnecessary competitive drilling, then any question upon which the
Contracting Parties are unable to agree concerning the manner in
which the structure or field shall be exploited or concerning the
116. MOUTON, supra note 114, at 422. In the Grisbadama arbitration, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration did not recognize that Norway might have an equity remaining in the Grisbadama banks.
Such an equity might well have been capable of transformation into a claim for compensation out
of a proportion of the Swedish catch. Instead, Sweden was awarded a monopoly of the Grisbadarna
lobster fishery, and Norway was given a monopoly of the lobster fishery of the Skjottegrunde. Supra
note 114. Additionally, Admiral Mouton has said:
The arbitrators held that the boundary line ought to be traced: "so that it would pass
midway between the Grisbadarna banks on the one side and Skjottegrunde on the
other." The arbitrators did not want to cut through a bank, which is in fact also an
application of the same principle of leaving intact the unity of a deposit, this time
not of minerals but of marine resources. A demarcation, so the award continues,
which would assign the Grisbadarna to Sweden is supported by the circumstances
that "lobster fishing in the shoals of Grisbadarna had been carried on for a much
longer time, to a much larger extent, and by a much larger number of fishermen by
the subjects of Sweden than by the subjects of Norway." ... On the other hand it
was averred that "the Norwegian fishermen have almost always participated in the
lobster fishing on the Skjottegrunde in a comparatively more effective manner than
at the Grisbadarna," which warranted a demarcation assigning the Skjottegrunde to
Norway.
MOUTON, supra note 114, at 422.
117. See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Relating to the Exploration
of Single Geological Structures Extending Across the Dividing Line on the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea, Netherlands No. 1 (1965), Cmnd. No. 2830.
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manner in which the costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be
apportioned, shall, at the request of either Contracting Party, be
referred to a single Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by the Contracting Parties. The decision of the Arbitrator shall be binding upon
the Contracting Parties.
Like Admiral Mouton's thesis "never two straws in one glass," 118
these provisions of the single structure Agreement make possible the
unified working of a single resource or deposit. Unlike the suggestion
that one state, not necessarily in the fiduciary role of an "agent state,"
should alone work a common geological structure, these provisions call
for an equitable apportionment of the costs and proceeds. The equities
underlying such an apportionment could be measured by reference either
to the proportion which each state's share of the common deposit bears
to the whole, or to their technological, managerial, or monetary contribution. Setting aside the instrumental equities, the relative needs of each
state could bring about distributive justice by using the resource's capacity, if equitably managed, to ameliorize the per capita wealth of each
adjacent nation. Once the choice of equitable values is settled, one state
could become the "agent state" of all the others, and distribute burdens
and benefits according to the measured or agreed upon norms or standards
of apportionment. On the other hand, a common supranational managerial
agency controlling the resource and distributing its benefits would provide
at least the appearance of the greater objectivity and, hence, of greater
functional equity.
Another interesting variation on the idea of the unitized working of a
mineral deposit without establishing an international managerial regime
is provided by the 1939 agreement between the Netherlands and the
German Reich." 9 This regime provided for the most economic mining
of a common coal deposit on either side of the two countries' frontiers.
Each country, independently of the surface boundaries, followed its own
vein of the mineral. 20 The boundary between the two countries on the
surface was not applied in the coal galleries. There was neither any
118. MOUTON, supra note 114, at 421.
119. See Treaty Between the German Reich and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Determination of the Working Boundary of the Coal Mines Situated on Both Sides of the Frontier Along
the River Worm, May 17, 1939, [1939] Staatsblad van het Kononkrijk der Nederlanden No. 30,
199 L.N.T.S. 251. One method contemplated as a possible outcome of the negotiations was the
unified working of a single resource or deposit with an apportionment, among the parties, of the
costs and proceeds. To work the deposit in a unified way as the agent state that state would, in
effect, have to be given a usufructory right over the resources on the other side of the boundary
coupled with an obligation to account and to act, generally, in a fiduciary manner. For a fuller
indication of this "agent state" model see Goldie, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Ray
of Hope for the International Court? [hereinafter cited as Goldie, Ray of Hope], 16 N.Y.L. FORUM
327, 370 (1970), and Goldie, supra note 96, at 44, 45.
120. See Treaty Between Germany and letherlands, supra note 119.
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recognition of an obligation to compensate the state in whose territory a
deposit was to be worked in any given case, nor any concept of a community of interest which might best be made manifest in a common and
fiduciary regime governed by such equitable principles as reliance and
proportionality. Presumably, the mutual equities of the states would cancel
one another as both states intended to cross each other's boundaries as
the exigencies of mining and the presence of seams demanded. This last
variation, however, although of interest, is clearly not suitable for the
rational working of an oil or gas deposit.
Continuing Conciliation
Disputes between states attempting to exercise legal rights to a resource
often cause both a rise in international tensions and a loss of opportunities
for developing that resource. A purely legal dispute tends to focus attention
upon the analysis of the validity of the exclusive and contending claims
put forward, rather than upon the resource's potential for development.
In contrast to the barrenness of purely legal disputes, the flexible procedures offered by managerial regimes to disputants include the possibility
of developing a resource and of reallocating the increased productivity
or value. Surely such values, and even the procedures through which
they are expressed, are available for negotiators and draftsmen of regimes
which govern the development of a single geological structure common
to the legal continental shelves of two or more states.
The value of such flexible procedures is illustrated in the resolution of
sterile legal confrontations between India and Pakistan by the settlement
which the "good offices"'' of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development achieved in the dispute between those two countries
over the waters of the Indus River.'22 By raising extensive credits, and
by working with engineers and administrators whose focus of interest
centered far more upon the development of the resource than upon disputes
about legal rights to its value at the current level, the factual basis of the
dispute was changed, with salutary results.' 23 The bank, through its pow121. The late Professor Baxter has pointed out that:
While the International Bank for Reconstruction and development referred to its
role as one of "good offices" its function actually went beyond "good offices" or
"mediation" in the technical senses of these terms. As the real differences were
brought to light, the Bank was forced to play a more active part in working out a
solution. The Bank pursued its own enquiries into the facts, and it was the Bank
which at various stages suggested principles upon which the agreements might be
based-a process which might be describes as "continuing conciliation."
Baxter, The Indus Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINs 443, 477 (Garretson,
Hayton & Olmstead eds. 1967).
122. Id.
123. Baxter, supra note 121, at 476, has written:
Instead of there being a limited and insufficient quantity of water to quarrel over,
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erful negotiating position, was able to insist on what was, in effect, a
supranational administrative organ making transnational allocations in
terms of the equities for which it was able to obtain agreement.
As a practical matter one cannot assume that funds of the magnitude
of those raised by the bank for the Indus Valley project would be available
to develop a common submarine geological structure stretching across
the continental shelves of a plurality of adjacent and/or opposite states.
Such financial power as the bank brought to bear in the interest of amicable
settlement would not, in most cases at least, be at the disposal of the
commissions established to engage in supranational administrative activity unless the participating states overcame their usual reluctance to relinquish their ultimate power to define their goals, policies, and values.
There is, however, one basis for optimism: even if the lack of financial
power were to deprive the supranational managerial agency of a coercive
authority, common sense inducements which stem from expectations of
benefits from an optimally developed resource might well provide the
administrative body with an authority which the parties could voluntarily
concede as a matter of enlightened self-interest.
Despite its utility to the settlement of the Indus River dispute, and even
to the resolution of conflicting claims in international river systems in
general, the blueprint of continuing conciliation may not be completely
apposite for the problems of exploiting transnational common submarine
mineral deposits. These regimes cannot entertain the goal of achieving
any final distribution of rights over their resources similar to the goal of
final settlement of disputed rights to the waters of an international river
system. Accordingly, the term "administrative conciliation" is suggested
to indicate the function of an agency empowered to regulate the development and exploitation of a mineral stock common to a number of states.
The agency would be empowered to balance disparate equities advanced
by diverse claimants, maintain economic returns on investment in the
resource and its utilization, and engage in scientific and conservation
activities. A managerial regime dedicated to the administrative concilithe supply of water would be increased to a level that would permit the needs of
both parties to be satisfied. The slate was wiped clean of the existing rights and
obligations of the parties, whatever they might be considered to have been.
He concluded his analysis of the dispute over the waters of the Indus River and of the International
Bank of Reconstruction and Development's "continuing conciliation" with the following observation:
The possibility of adjusting the dispute is enhanced if the mediator or conciliator is
authorized not merely to divide the existing water supplies but to work out a scheme
for the wider and more effective use of the water resources within the basin. The
argument that both parties can secure more water from the basin through cooperative
effort offers, if not a guarantee of success, at least some inducement for the parties
to work together.
Id. at 478.
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ation of two or more coastal states' continental shelf 124 would not only
achieve a far better utilization of the present resource than such partition
arrangements as those envisaged under Article 6 of the Continental Shelf
Convention, but also it would lead to the cultivation and enhancement
of the value of mining industry in question, to the great benefit and general
welfare of all the states concerned. Finally, a managerial regime could
achieve more equitable distribution of rights to exploit the resource by
improved means than would a regime legally bound within the scope of
existing know-how and technology.
Administrative Conciliation
Although it would necessarily involve a continuing conciliation approach, administrative conciliation, as a proposed means of investing
competence in a supranational managerial agency endowed with the mission of developing a resource lying across the common geological structure in the common continental shelves of two or more adjacent or opposite
states, would involve a number of important differences.
An administrative conciliation regime would not look to any final
settlement of claims. Rather, it would seek to provide a framework for
resolving differences by continually redistributing the satisfactions. In
fact, market fluctuations and technology changes call for continuing reappraisal of the basic criteria of the resources distribution among the countries involved. Administrative or managerial conciliation does not indicate
a process of widening the area of agreement by building on previously
settled aspects of a dispute. Instead, its purpose is to indicate the continuous management of the development, distribution, and redistribution
of the resources to accommodate continuously changing controlling factors. To carry out its tasks effectively, a conciliation commission would
have to operate without any goal of achieving final solutions. It would,
124. The amounts committed by the contributing states to the Indus Basin Development Fund
by December 31, 1968, (in U.S. Dollar equivalents as determined by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for accounting purposes at that date) were as follows:
$ 26,061,000.
Australia
36,246,361.
Canada
51,600,000.
Germany
138,540,000.
IBRD Loan & IDA Credit
168,803,200.
India
1,188,000.
Pakistan in L sterling
371,824,292.
in rupees
91,288,270.
United Kingdom
295,590,000.
United States dollar grant
121,220,000.
dollar loan
235,000,000.
rupees
$1,537,361,123.
Letter from Piero Sella, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, IBRD, to the author (Jan. 28, 1969).
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in fact, become a permanent administrative body regulating the region
to enhance the local transnational continental mining industry's efficiency
and value, and to achieve a just distribution of its products. If such a
commission were invested with supranational powers, the transnational
industry which would emerge, and all those who depend upon it, would
be better served. The commission would be able to administer the industry
as a single unit without having to respect the special claims of sovereign
states through which it would otherwise have to operate.
MultinationalPublic Enterprises'25
Multinational public enterprises are currently employed for many diverse purposes and in many different areas of international economic
activity, each established and justified by pragmatic and functional criteria. They are brought into being when the states creating them seek to
attain common ends, "by making use of the present social and scientific
opportunities to link together particular activities and interests, one at a
time, according to need and acceptability, giving each a joint authority
and policy limited to that activity alone." 26
Secondly, although they are called upon to fulfill very divergent tasks,
these entities "possess certain common characteristics which distinguish
them from other international organizations. They perform economic tasks
of a public nature, for which they require the long-term investment of
capital and a permanent organization. They generally perform operational
functions, and are vested with a power of direct action."' 27 Multinational
public enterprises are, therefore, "clothed with the power of government,
but [are] possessed of the flexibility and initiative of private enterprise. "'2 8
Adequately designed, a multinational public enterprise could effectively combine the advantages of the "agent state"' 29 solution with those
of administrative conciliation. Such an enterprise could either engage
directly in continental shelf mining as a multinational enterprise or, alternatively, license mining corporations to ensure compliance with the
standards set by the enterprise for equipment safety, employment policies,
125. For the choice of this term, from among a number of possibilities, see FLIGLER, MULTI(IBRD Study 1967).
126. Mitrany, The Prospectof Integration:FederalorFunctional,4 COMMON MKT. STUDIES 119,

NATIONAL PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 7-8

135 (1965). See also MrrRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 41 (1966).
127. FLIGLER, supra note 125, at 7.
128. Friedmann, International Public Corporations, 6 MODERN L. REV. 185, 186 (1943), quoting

President Roosevelt's characterization of the Tennessee Valley Authority. For a discussion of the
more detailed aspects of a blueprint for a multinational public corporation to regulate a regional
fishery, see Goldie, supra note 96, at 47-51.
129. For a discussion of the concept, in the context of fisheries management, of the "agent state,"
see CHRISTY & Scorr, supra note 102, at 196; Goldie, supra note 96, at 44-45. For a discussion of
this concept in terms of both fisheries and minerals, see Goldie, Ray of Hope, supra note 119, at
327, 370-74 (1970).
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and economic efficiency. In either case, the enterprise would have to be
accorded either administrative control or a monopoly of the industry. It
would enjoy the advantages of the agent state, as it would be the delegate
to all states participating in the regime. The public enterprise approach
would, in addition, avert the disadvantage of the agent state since no
state, or group of states, would be favored. The public enterprise, moreover, would provide the advantage of the administrative conciliation procedure, since its blueprints should include an equitably-oriented commission
with authority to give overall directions to the corporation in light of the
values, demands, expectations, and contributions of the participating states.
Such a public intergovernmental corporation would have a further advantage, one which multinational public enterprises have in common,
namely that of building transnational habits of cooperation and of problem-solving. These transnational attitudes and habits expand to become
coterminous with the area and mandate of the regime rather than that of
any participating state. 3 °
The charter of an intergovernmental organization established for the
purpose of managing a multinational regional mineral deposit should
include provisions governing the entity's juridical personality (and nationality, if any), structure and control powers, privileges and immunities,
and the available procedures for the settlement of disputes. These various
considerations will be very briefly surveyed.' 3'
Constituent Instrument
The enterprise should be created by a treaty setting forth the main
outline of its structure, the political organ to which it is answerable, its
purposes, the basic guidelines of its policies, the framework of its intended
action, its obligations towards its member states and theirs towards it.
The statutes, articles of association, and powers to promulgate bylaws
should also be established by international agreement, preferably in the
form of a protocol or annex to the constituent treaty. The alternative,
namely the creation of the enterprise or, at least, the formulation of its
130. See, e.g., FLIGLER, supra note 125, at 10; CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES 348 (1964).
131. International public enterprises are deservedly becoming an important topic of study for
international lawyers. In addition to the works already cited, the following represent a useful selection:
SEWELL, FUNCTIONALISM AND WORLD POLITICS (1966); HANSON, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1965); BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 91-148, 306-41 (1965)

(but note Baxter's conclusion at 340-41 and his "Articles on the Navigation of International Canals"
at 343-45); FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216-20 (1964); FINER,
THE T.V.A., LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION (1944); Johnson, InternationalCooperation
in Satellite Communications Systems, 61 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 24 (1967); Note, Corporations
Formed Pursuantto Treaty, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1963); Sereni, InternationalEconomic Institutions and the Municipal Law ofStates, 96 RECUEIL DES COURS 133 (1959-I); Parry, The International
Public Corporation, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION: A COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 495 (Friedmann ed.
1954); and see Friedman, A Comparative Analysis, Id. 541, 593-94 (Friedmann ed. 1954).
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articles of association under the laws of a member state, might tend to
give that state a fulcrum to lever an undue advantage. Accordingly, the
format of an intergovernmental enterprise incorporated under the domestic
laws of one of the member states should be avoided.
JuridicalPersonality or Nationality
Juridical personality has been accorded to multinational public enterprises by conferring on them the nationality of one of the member states. 3 '
Whatever the merits of such a conferral may be in general, it would not
be appropriate for the enterprise proposed here, since the state whose
nationality had been conferred might well be placed in a position to obtain
favorable treatment vis-d-vis the enterprise, and the distribution of its
benefits. Accordingly, the constituent treaty should be drafted to confer
international legal personality on the enterprise. Since the enterprise would
not be universal, or even general, this conferral might not be accepted
as coming entirely within the scope of the decision of the ICJ in the
Injuries case. 133 On the other hand, if the international personality established in the treaty is necessary for the tasks the enterprise is structured
to perform, then an objective juridical personality should be considered
as having been created over and above that merely established by the
member states adherence and recognition alone. This thesis has an important practical significance. In order to establish its credit for the purpose
of entering into contractual relationships with public or private entities
in third countries, the enterprise must establish its legal capacity to enter
into binding engagements. This depends not only upon the competence
accorded to the enterprise in its constituent instrument and upon its juridical status under international law, but also upon the laws of the third
countries in which it wishes to engage in business transactions.
Structure and Control
The enterprise could be organized either as a licensing and supervisory
authority, a producers' cooperative, or an independent public entrepreneurial entity. In any case, it should be required to permit miners from
the member states to participate, without discrimination, in its activities,
whether as licensees or as employees. Distinct from the cooperative,
entrepreneurial, or licensing and supervisory structure of the enterprise,
a council or governing board made up of representatives of the member
states should be established with authority to exercise general overall
132. Parry, supra note 131.
133. Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 185. See also Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations 1962
I.C.J. 151.
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supervision, but not day-to-day management. This entity would be charged
with the task of insuring the public accountability of the enterprise and
of providing a forum for the release, or at least debate, of political
pressures which would remain. The governing board or council would
also insure that the enterprise's general direction would remain responsive
to those represented interests dependent on the exploration of the resources
brought under the regime but which have no direct participation in it, for
example, consumers and exporters. Strictly business decisions, on the
other hand, should remain the function of the Board of Directors. The
Board of Directors, which should be seen as an executive body at the
apex of the enterprise, would reach decisions on the distribution of mining
licenses or on the quantity of the mineral to be mined from the perspective
of the requirements of an orderly market and of the optional exploitation
of the resource. The Board of Directors should also balance the distribution of the surplus return, designated "the economic rent of the resource,' 34 with other significant values and interests germane to the
industry and pressing for recognition.
Powers
The constituent instruments should, clearly, grant all necessary and
proper powers to the enterprise ito enable it to perform its functions
adequately. These should include the power to engage in business undertakings and agreements of all ,kinds; buy, own, and sell land and all
other forms of property; accept gifts; ,sue and be sued; compound claims;
and perform all conditions necessary to the fulfillment of its purposes.
The enterprise should also be empowered to negotiate and conclude agreements with member states and third states as a subject of public international law. States should also be answerable to the enterprise for breaches
of agreements, wrongs apart from agreements, and injuries to it and its
employees under international law. The enterprise should, finally, be
independently answerable for wrongs as a distinct bearer of international
rights and duties. 3' 5 The contracting states should be bound to take all
action necessary to facilitate the enterprise's operations and to give adequate priorities to it in their respective economic development plans.
Finally, the constituent agreements should explicitly state that all implied
powers necessary for the enterprise's adequate fulfillment of its functions
and purposes should be imputed to it.
134. For a discussion of this criterion, in terms of the economic uses and management of fisheries,
see Goldie, supra note 96, at 21-23.
135. For similar suggestions, but with respect to the liability of international organizations engaged
in activities in outer space, see FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE 4547 (1968).
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Privileges and Immunities
The operational needs of the enterprise should dictate the scope of its
privileges and immunities. On the one hand, if the enterprise had no
privileges and immunities, it could be vulnerable to undue pressure of
its host state (or states) and become little better than an instrument of its
(or their) policy.' 36 On the other hand, if its privileges and immunities
were to exceed its functions, the enterprise might become a refuge for
privilege and incompetence. The proper scope of the enterprise's privileges and immunities is what is necessary for the impartial, efficient, and
economical discharge of the functions of the organization. 3' 7 In particular,
the tax status of the enterprise, as distinct from that of its members, may
create problems of independence. The enterprise should be accorded
immunity from all forms of taxes on its assets and revenues, as well as
on its acts, operations, services, and transactions.
Settlement of Disputes
The constituent agreements should contain special provisions for the
friendly settlement of disputes by conciliatory means in the governing
body. Failing this, procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes,
perhaps analogous to those in Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations,' 38 should be provided. Finally, and as a matter of last resort, the
treaty should provide for the establishment of a judicial tribunal with
compulsory jurisdiction. Refusal to accept this jurisdiction, or to-comply
with the tribunal's judgment, should be enforced by expulsion from the
regime or by such lesser enforcement measures as the governing board
may determine. Ultimately, however, the peaceful settlement of disputes
arising out of the efficient management of the regime's resources, the
just participation in its activities and decisions, or the equitable distribution of its benefits, should be predicated on the self-interest of the
disputants. The regime should be so conducted that each member state
could readily perceive that a greater advantage enured to it by remaining
a participating member state of the regime than by "going it alone." Such
a perception should result from a freely determined and enlightened selfinterest rather than coercion, intimidation, or victimization.
CONCLUSION
International judicial settlement, arbitration, and customary forms of
conciliation, in their search for the single conclusive resolution of issues
136: For an example acknowledging the importance of this consideration, see Broadbent v.
Organization of American States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Brief for the United Nations
as Amicus Curiae, Broadbent v. O.A.S., 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
137. Broadbent, 628 F.2d 27.
138. U.N. Charter art. 33.
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created by an adversarial posture of the parties, have traditionally looked
to legal criteria for their modes of decision. This article has proposed a
managerial basis for transboundary resource development in which disputes would be progressively conciliated rather than the adjudication of
opposing claims. Equitable developments, standards, and values leading
to the individualization of justice, provide the managerial regime with its
modalities and materials of decision. Such a regime, directed to achieving
equities as managerial goals, would have many advantages over the strict
values commonly argued in confrontational situations and modes. Such
an equitably grounded regime could, for example, increase the efficiency
of the resource's production, thus reducing the cost of mining per measured amount. The regime could improve the engineering and managerial
means of exploitation, thereby increasing the fund to be distributed between various developmental purposes of the region, and provide for
further improvements of the uses of the continental shelf itself. The regime
would, furthermore, be directed towards effectuating a distributive justice
in allocating the benefits derived from the resource's economic exploitation. To enable the managerial regime to work efficiently, it would be
necessary for participating states to waive whatever legal claims they
might assert in a more traditional arena. Appropriately persuasive arguments, in terms of enlightened self-interest and impartial justice, could
convince participating states to effectively waive their sovereign rights.
Five forms of international resource management have been considered
relevant to international equitable principles: national quotas; agent states;
continuing conciliation; administrative conciliation; and multinational enterprises. The models of administrative and managerial conciliation have
been discussed in variable terms, namely: a commission to continuously
regulate the conduct of a common continental shelf mining industry with
a view to increased efficiency and economic returns. Finally, the regime
of a multinational public enterprise has been offered to manage a given
common resource or industry, either by means of a system of licenses or
by establishing a common intergovernmental public entrepreneur acting
on behalf of the participating states. The most beneficial regulation and
development of a regional mining industry would best be served by one
monopolistic multinational public enterprise. Between the two types of
intergovernmental public agencies discussed in this article, the licensing
authority and the operating enterprise, the enterprise which directly conducts the industry and acts as the sole employer and co-operative of the
mining industry of the participating states is preferred for several reasons.
It would be more effectively geared to achieving the goal of fuller managerial responsiveness to the equitable needs of the region, because the
enterprise would control the industry and not merely function as an intermediary between the miners and the governing board. Also, the op-
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erating enterprise would have more direct control over mining activities
than would the licensing model, enabling it to effectively realize conservation and distributional welfare goals. The multinational public enterprise would provide the most effective substitute for the traditional
dichotomy of the international law of the sea between seas subject to
coastal states' exclusive rights and the free high seas open to all. Moreover, the multinational operating enterprise could provide models for
effective and equitable regional regimes of participation in, and distribution of, the wealth of common continental shelf mining activities.
Positive regimes would replace the traditional negative system predicated
on, and justified by, the isolation and divisive contentiousness inherent
in a legally severed, but geologically homogeneous and structurally unified, continental shelf. Finally, the type of blueprints proposed in the
foregoing pages could offer alternatives to the legalistic perspectives which
focus on contentions about opposing claims and, instead, provide machinery of administrative conciliation and conflict management transcending legalism.

